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Abstract. Information-based argumentation aims to model the partner’s reason-
ing apparatus to the extent that an agent can work with it to achieve outcomes that
are mutually satisfactory and lay the foundation for continued interaction and per-
haps lasting business relationships. Information-based agents take observations at
face value, qualify them with a belief probability and build models solely on the
basis of messages received. Using augmentative dialogue that describes what is
good or bad about proposals, these agents observe such statements and aim to
model the way their partners react, and then to generate dialogue that works in
harmony with their partner’s reasoning.
1 Introduction
This paper is in the area labelled: information-based agency [1]. An information-based
agent has an identity, values, needs, plans and strategies all of which are expressed using
a fixed ontology in probabilistic logic for internal representation and in an illocution-
ary language [2] for communication. All of the forgoing is represented in the agent’s
deliberative machinery.
In line with our “Information Principle” [2], an information-based agent makes no a
priori assumptions about the states of the world or the other agents in it — represented
in a world model inferred from the messages that it receives. These agents build up their
models by comparing expectation with observation — in this way we have constructed
general models of trust, honour and reliability in a single framework [1].
[2] describes a rhetorical argumentation framework that supports argumentative ne-
gotiation. It does this by taking into account: the relative information gain of a new ut-
terance and the relative semantic distance between an utterance and the dialogue history.
Then [3] considered the effect that argumentative dialogues have on the on-going rela-
tionship between a pair of negotiating agents. Neither of these contributions addressed
the relationship between argumentative utterances or strategies for argumentation. In
this paper we adress these two issues.
The basis of our approach differs from [4] who builds on the notion of one argument
“attacking” another. With the exception of a logical ‘attack’, whether one argument
attacks another or not will depend on the receiving agent’s private circumstances that are
unlikely to be fully articulated. Thus, the notion of attack is of little use to information-
based agents that build their models on the contents of utterances. This paper considers
how to counter the effect of the partner agent’s arguments, and aims to lead a negotiation
towards some desired outcome by persuasive argumentation.
This paper is based in rhetorical argumentation [5]. For example, suppose I am
shopping for a new car and have cited “suitability for a family” as a criterion. The
salesman says “This LandMonster is great value,” and I reply “My grandmother could
not climb into that.” Classical argumentation may attempt to refute the matriarch’s lack
of gymnastic prowess or the car’s inaccessibility. Taking a less confrontational and more
constructively persuasive view we might note that this statement impacts negatively
on the “suitability for a family” criterion, and attempt to counter that impact possibly
with “It’s been voted No 1 for children.” Although a smarter response may look for an
argument that is semantically closer: “The car’s height ensures a very comfortable ride
over rough terrain that is popular with old people.”
Information-based agents build their world models using an expectation/observation
framework; this includes a model of the negotiation partner’s behaviour. Agents form an
a priori expectation of the significance of every event that occurs, and when the effect
of that event is finally observed they revise their expectations. The model of behaviour
includes measures of: trust, honour, reliability, intimacy, balance and disposition —
disposition attempts to model what the partner means which may not be what they say.
These measures are summarised using: temporal criteria, the structure of the ontology,
and the illocutionary category of observed utterances.
Our argumentation agent has to perform two key functions: to understand incoming
utterances and to generate responses. The approach is founded on a model of contract
acceptance that is described in Section 2. Section 3 details a scenario that provides the
context for the discussion. Sections 4 and 5 consider the scenario from each side of the
bargaining table. Reactive and proactive argumentation strategies are given in Section 6,
and Section 7 concludes.
2 Contract Acceptance
No matter what interaction strategy an agent uses, and no matter whether the communi-
cation language is that of simple bargaining or rich argumentation, a negotiation agent
will have to decide whether or not to sign each contract on the table. We will argue in
Section 4 that the buyer will be uncertain of his preferences in our Scenario described
in Section 3. If an agent’s preferences are uncertain then it may not make sense to link
the agent’s criterion for contract acceptance to a strategy that aims to optimise its util-
ity. Instead, we pose the more general question: “how certain am I that δ = (φ, ϕ) is
a good contract to sign?” — under realistic conditions this may be easy to estimate.
Pt(sign(α, β, χ, δ)) estimates the certainty, expressed as a probability, that α should
sign3 proposal δ in satisfaction of her need χ, where in (φ, ϕ) φ is α’s commitment and
ϕ is β’s. α will accept δ if: Pt(sign(α, β, χ, δ)) > c, for some level of certainty c.
To estimate Pt(sign(α, β, χ, δ)), α will be concerned about what will occur if con-
tract δ is signed. If agent α receives a commitment from β, α will be interested in any
3 A richer formulation is Pt(eval(α, β, χ, δ) = ei) where eval(·) is a function whose range is
some descriptive evaluation space containing terms such as “unattractive in the long term”.
variation between β’s commitment, ϕ, and what is actually observed, as the enactment,
ϕ′. We denote the relationship between commitment and enactment:
Pt(Observe(α,ϕ′)|Commit(β, α, ϕ))
simply as Pt(ϕ′|ϕ) ∈ Mt, and now α has to estimate her belief in the acceptability of
each possible outcome δ′ = (φ′, ϕ′). Let Pt(acc(α, χ, δ′)) denote α’s estimate of her
belief that the outcome δ′ will be acceptable in satisfaction of her need χ, then we have:
Pt(sign(α, β, χ, δ)) = f(Pt(δ′|δ),Pt(acc(α, χ, δ′))) (1)
for some function f ;4 if f is the arithmetic product then this expression is mathematical
expectation. f may be more sensitive; for example, it may be defined to ensure that no
contract is signed if there is a significant probability for a catastrophic outcome.
There is no prescriptive way in which α should define Pt(acc(α, χ, δ′)), it is a
matter for applied artificial intelligence to capture the essence of what matters in the
application. In any real application the following three components at least will be re-
quired. Pt(satisfy(α, χ, δ′)) represents α’s belief that enactment δ′ will satisfy her need
χ. Pt(obj(α, δ′)) represents α’s belief that δ′ is a fair deal against the open marketplace
— it represents α’s objective valuation. Pt(sub(α, χ, δ′)) represents α’s belief that δ′ is
acceptable in her own terms taking account of her ability to meet her commitment φ [2]
[1], and any way in which δ′ has value to her personally5 — it represents α’s subjective
valuation. That is:
Pt(acc(α, χ, δ′)) = g(Pt(satisfy(α, χ, δ′)),Pt(obj(α, δ′)),Pt(sub(α, χ, δ′))) (2)
for some function g.
Suppose that an agent is able to estimate: Pt(satisfy(α, χ, δ′)), Pt(obj(α, δ′)) and
Pt(sub(α, χ, δ′)). The specification of the aggregating g function will then be a strictly
subjective decision. A highly cautious agent may choose to define:
Pt(acc(α, χ, δ′)) =

1 if: Pt(satisfy(α, χ, δ′)) > η1
∧ Pt(obj(α, δ′)) > η2 ∧ Pt(sub(α, χ, δ′)) > η3
0 otherwise.
for some threshold constants ηi. Whereas an agent that was prepared to permit some
propagation of confidence from one factor to compensate another could define:
Pt(acc(α, χ, δ′)) = Pt(satisfy(α, χ, δ′))η1 × Pt(obj(α, δ′))η2 × Pt(sub(α, χ, δ′))η3
where the ηi balance the influence of each factor.
The point of this is: if an agent aims to produce persuasive argumentative dia-
logue then in the absence of any specific information concerning the structure of g
4 β influences the equation in the sense that different βs yield different Pt(δ′|δ).
5 For example, when buying a new digital camera, α may give a high subjective valuation to a
camera that uses the same memory cards as her existing camera.
the agent should ignore g and concentrate on the three categories: Pt(satisfy(α, χ, δ′)),
Pt(obj(α, δ′)) and Pt(sub(α, χ, δ′)).
So how then willα specify: Pt(satisfy(α, χ, δ)), Pt(sub(α, χ, δ)) and Pt(obj(α, δ))?
Of these three factors only Pt(obj(α, δ)) has a clear meaning, but it may only be es-
timated if there is sufficient market data available. In the case of selling sardines this
may well be so, but in the case of Google launching a take-over bid for Microsoft it will
not6. Concerning Pt(satisfy(α, χ, δ)) and Pt(sub(α, χ, δ)) we assume that an agent
will somehow assess each of these as some combination of the confidence levels across
a set of privately-known criteria. For example, if I am buying a camera then I may be
prepared to define:
Pt(satisfy(α, χ, δ)) = h(Pt(easy-to-use(α, δ)),Pt(well-built(α, δ))) (3)
for some function h. Any attempt to model another agent’s h function will be as difficult
as modelling g above. But, it is perfectly reasonable to suggest that by observing my
argumentative dialogue an agent could form a view as to which of these two criteria
above was more important.
This paper considers how an agent may observe the argumentative dialogue with
the aim of modelling, within each of the three basic factors, the partner’s criteria and
the relative importance of those criteria. In repeated dealings between two agents, this
model may be strengthened when the objects of the successive negotiations are seman-
tically close but not necessarily identical.
3 The Scenario
Rhetorical argumentation is freed from the rigour of classical argumentation and de-
scriptions of it can take the form of “this is how it works here” and “this is how it works
there” without describing a formal basis. We attempt to improve on this level of vagary
by using a general scenario and describing the behaviour of our agents within it.
In a general retail scenario there is a seller agent, α, and a buyer, β. The items for
sale are abstracted from: digital cameras, mobile phones, PDAs, smart video recorders,
computer software, sewing machines and kitchen mixers. The features of an item are
those that are typically listed on the last few pages of an instruction booklet. For exam-
ple, a camera’s features could include the various shutter speeds that it is capable of,
the various aperture settings, the number of years of warranty, and so on — together the
features describe the capabilities of the item. For the purpose of comparison with other
items, β will consider a particular item as a typed Boolean vector over the (possible)
features of each item available, this vector shows which feature is present. The state of
an item is then specified by identifying which of the item’s features are ‘on’. For exam-
ple, the state of a camera could be: ‘ready’ with aperture set to ‘f8’ and shutter speed
set to ‘1 500’th of a second’. In this scenario an offer is a pair (supply of a particular
item, supply of some money) being α’s and β’s commitments respectively.
β may wish to know how well an item performs certain tasks. Software agents are
not naturally endowed with the range of sensory and motor functions to enable such
6 In this example the subjective valuation will be highly complex.
an evaluation. We imagine that the seller agent has an associated tame human who will
demonstrate how the various items perform particular tasks on request, but performs
no other function. We also imagine that the buyer agent has an associated tame human
who can observe what is demonstrated, articulates an evaluation of it that is passed to
its own agent, but performs no other function.
To simplify our set up we assume that the seller, α, is β’s only source of information
about what tasks each item can perform, and, as we describe below, what sequence of
actions are necessary to make an item perform certain tasks7. That is, our multiagent
system consists only of {α, β}, and the buyer is denied access to product reviews, but
does have access to market pricing data. This restriction simplifies the interactions and
focusses the discussion on the argumentation.
For example, if the item is a camera the buyer may wish to observe how to set the
camera’s states so that it may be used for ‘point-and-shoot’ photography. If the item is
a sewing machine she may wish to see how to make a button hole on a piece of cloth.
If the item is graphics software she may wish to see how to draw a polygon with a two-
pixel red line and to colour the polygon’s interior blue. These tasks will be achieved by
enacting a process that causes the item to pass though a sequence of states that will be
explained to β by α. So far our model consists of: features, states, sequences and tasks.
We assume that the object of the negotiation is clear where the object is an uninstan-
tiated statement of what both agents jointly understand as the intended outcome — e.g.
I wish to exchange a quantity of eggs of certain quality for cash. We assume that each
agent is negotiating with the aim of satisfying some goal or need that is private knowl-
edge. In determining whether a negotiation outcome is acceptable in satisfaction of a
need we assume that an agent will blend the factors in our acceptance model described
in Section 2. We assume that for each factor an agent will articulate a set of criteria that
together determine whether the factor is acceptable. The criteria may include private
information such as deadlines.
More formally, there is a set of feature names, F , a set of item names, I, a fea-
ture mapping: feature : I → ×n(B : F) where there are n feature names, and B is
a boolean variable that may be > or ⊥. Each item name belongs to a unique concept
— e.g.: “Nikon123 is-a camera”. For any particular item name, ν, feature(ν) will be a
typed Boolean vector indicating which features that item ν possesses. Let Fν be the set
of nν features that item ν possesses. At any particular time t, the state of an item is a
mapping: statet : I → ×nν (B : Fν) where the value > denotes that the corresponding
feature of that item is ‘on’. A sequence is an ordered set of states, (wi), where succes-
sive states differ in one feature only being on and off. A sequence is normally seen as
performing a task that are linked by the mapping: to-do : T → 2S where T is the set of
tasks and S the set of all possible sequences — that is, there many be several sequences
that perform a task. If a sequence is performed on an item then, with the assistance
of a human, the agent rates how well it believes the sequence performs the associated
task. The evaluation space, E , could be {good, OK, bad}. A criterion is a predicate:
criterion(ν), meaning that the item ν satisfies criterion ‘criterion’. The set of criteria is
7 In other words, the sort of information that is normally available in the item’s Instruction
Booklet — we assume that α conveys this information accurately.
C. The argumentation requirements include (where x ∈ V , c ∈ C, v = feature(x),
y ∈ T , z ∈ S, and r ∈ R):
– “I need an x”
– “What sort of x do you need?”
– “I need an x that satisfies criterion c”
– “What features does x have?”
– “x has features v”
– “How do you make x do y”
– “The sequence z performed on x does y”
– “Perform sequence z on x”
– “If sequence z is performed on x then how would you rate that?”
– “I rate the sequence z as performed on x as r”
4 The Buyer Assesses A Contract
In this Section we consider how the buyer might use the general framework in Section 2
to assess a contract8. In general an agent will be concerned about the enactment of
any contract signed as described in Equation 1. In the scenario described in Section 3,
enactment is not an issue, and so we focus on Equation 2. To simplify things we ignore
the subjective valuation factor. Before addressing the remaining two factors we argue
that the buyer will not necessarily be preference aware.
Consider a human agent with a need for a new camera who goes to a trusted camera
shop. If the agent is preference aware he will be able to place the twenty to fifty cam-
eras on offer in order of preference. If is reasonable to suggest that a normal, intelligent
human agent could not achieve this with any certainty, nor could he with confidence
represent his uncertainty in his preferences as a probability distribution over his prefer-
ences. This lack of awareness of preferences may be partially due to lack of information
about each camera. But, what could “perfect information” realistically mean in this ex-
ample? Even if the purchaser could borrow all the cameras for a day and had access to
trusted, skilled users of each camera even then we suggest that our human agent would
still be unable to specify a preference order with confidence. The underlying reason
being the size and complexity of the issue space required to describe all of the fea-
tures of every camera on offer, and the level of subjective judgement required to relate
combinations of those features to meaningful criteria.
In large issue spaces, in terms of which an agent is unable to specify a preference
ordering, there is a useful special case when it is possible to specify preferences on each
issue individually (e.g. “I prefer to pay less than more”, “I prefer to have a feature on
the camera to not having it”). In this case the agent is individual preference aware.
4.1 Assessing Pt(satisfy(β, χ, δ))
First β must give meaning to Pt(satisfy(β, χ, δ)) by defining suitable criteria and the
way that the belief should be aggregated across those criteria. Suppose one of β’s cri-
teria is Pt(ease-of-use(β, δ)). The idea is that β will ask α to demonstrate how certain
8 The seller will have little difficulty in deciding whether a contract is acceptable if he knows
what the items cost.
tasks are performed, will observe the sequences that α performs, and will use those
observations to revise this probability distribution until some clear verdict appears.
Suppose the information acquisition process is managed by a plan π. Let random
variable X represent Pt(ease-of-use(β, δ) = ei) where the ei are values from an eval-
uation space that could be E ={fantastic, acceptable, just OK, shocking}. Then given
a sequence s that was supposed to achieve task τ , suppose that β’s tame human rates
s as evidence for ease-of-use as e ∈ E with probability z. Suppose that β attaches a
weighting Rt(π, τ, s) to s, 0 < R < 1, which is β’s estimate of the significance of the
observation of sequence swithin plan π as an indicator of the true value ofX . For exam-
ple, the on the basis of the observation alone β might rate ease-of-use as e = acceptable
with probability z = 0.8, and separately give a weighting of Rt(π, τ, s) = 0.9 to the
sequence s as an indicator of ease-of-use. For an information-based agent each plan π
has associated update functions, Jπ(·), such that JXπ (s) is a set of linear constraints
on the posterior distribution for X . In this example, the posterior value of ‘acceptable’
would simply be constrained to 0.8.
Denote the prior distribution Pt(X) by p, and let p(s) be the distribution with min-






the constraints JXs (s). Then let q(s) be the distribution:




q(s) if q(s) is more interesting than p
p otherwise
(5)
A general measure of whether q(s) is more interesting than p is: K(q(s)‖D(X)) >





is the Kullback-Leibler distance between
two probability distributions x and y, and D(X) is the expected distribution in the ab-
sence of any observations — D(X) could be the maximum entropy distribution. Finally,
Pt+1(X) = Pt(X(s)). This procedure deals with integrity decay, and with two probabil-
ities: first, the probability z in the rating of the sequence s that was intended to achieve
τ , and second β’s weighting Rt(π, τ, s) of the significance of τ as an indicator of the
true value of X . Equation 5 is intended to prevent weak information from decreasing
the certainty of Pt+1(X). For example if the current distribution is (0.1, 0.7, 0.1, 0.1),
indicating an “acceptable” rating, then weak evidence P(X = acceptable) = 0.25 is
discarded.
Equation 4 simply adds in new evidence p(s) to p weighted with Rt(π, τ, s). This
is fairly crude, but the observations are unlikely to be independent and the idea is that π
9 Given a probability distribution q, the minimum relative entropy distribution p = (p1, . . . , pI)
subject to a set of J linear constraints g = {gj(p) = aj ·p−cj = 0}, j = 1, . . . , J (that must
include the constraint
P





. This may be calculated





+ λ · g. Minimising L,
{ ∂L
∂λj
= gj(p) = 0}, j = 1, . . . , J is the set of given constraints g, and a solution to ∂L∂pi =
0, i = 1, . . . , I leads eventually to p. Entropy-based inference is a form of Bayesian inference
that is convenient when the data is sparse [6] and encapsulates common-sense reasoning [7].
will specify a “fairly comprehensive” set of tasks aimed to determine Pt(X) to a level
of certainty sufficient for Equation 2.
4.2 Assessing Pt(obj(α, δ))
Pt(obj(β, δ)) estimates the belief that δ is acceptable in the open-market that β may ob-
serve in the scenario. Information-based agents model what they don’t know with cer-
tainty as probability distributions. Suppose that X is a discrete random variable whose
true value is the open-market value of an item. First, β should be able to bound X to an
interval (xmin, xmax) — if this is all the evidence that β can muster then X will be the
flat distribution (with maximum entropy) in this interval, and Pt(obj(β, (item, y)) =∑
x≥y P(X = x). β may observe evidence, perhaps as observed sale prices for similar
items, that enables him to revise particular values in the distribution for X . A method
[2] similar to that described in Section 4.1 is used to derive the posterior distribution
— it is not detailed here. An interesting aspect of this approach is that it works equally
well when the valuation space has more than one dimension.
5 The Seller Models the Buyer
In this Section we consider how the seller might model the buyer’s contract acceptance
logic in an argumentative context. As in Section 4 we focus on Equation 2 and for
reasons of economy concentrate on the factor: Pt(satisfy(α, χ, δ)).
5.1 Modelling Contract Acceptance
Suppose that β has found an item that he wants to buy, α will be interested in how much
he is prepared to pay. In a similar way to Section 4.2, α can interpret β’s proposals as
willingness to accept the offers proposed, and counter-offers as reluctance to accept the
agent’s prior offer — all of these interpretations being qualified with an epistemic be-
lief probability. Entropy-based inference is then used to derive a complete probability
distribution over the space of offers for a random variable that represents the partner’s
limit offers. This distribution is “the least biased estimate possible on the given infor-
mation; i.e. it is maximally noncommittal with regard to missing information” [8]. If
there are n-issues then the space of limit offers will be an (n− 1)-dimensional surface
through offer space. As described in [2], this method works well as long as the number
of issues is not large and as long as the agent is aware of its partner’s preferences along
each dimension of the issue space.
5.2 Estimating β’s key criteria.
α’s world model,Mt, contains probability distributions that model the agent’s belief in
the world, including the state of β. In particular, for every criterion c ∈ C α associates
a random variable C with probability mass function Pt(C = ei).
β may present information in the form of a high-level description of what is re-
quired; e.g. “I want a camera for every-day family use”. In a sense this is nothing more
than a criterion, but it does not fit comfortably within the terms of Equation 2 and may
have implications for all of them. We call such a statement as the object of the nego-
tiation. It is realistic to assume that the object is common knowledge to some degree.
We assume that there is a structured section of the ontology that describes negotiation
objects. We also assume that for each object there is are prior probabilities associated
with each of a set of negotiation criteria represented in another section of the ontol-
ogy. For example, the object “A camera for every-day family use” may associate the
prior probability distribution (0.6, 0.4, 0.0, 0.0) with “ease of use for point-and-shoot”
in terms of the example evaluation space given above.
The distributions that relate object to criteria may be learned from prior experience.
If Pt(C = e|O = o) is the prior distribution for criteria C over an evaluation space
given that the object is o, then given evidence from a completed negotiation with object
o we use the standard update procedure described in Section 4.1. For example, given
evidence that α believes with probability p that C = ei in a negotiation with object o
then Pt+1(C = e|O = o) is the result of applying the constraint P(C = ei|O = o) = p
with minimum relative entropy inference as described previously, where the result of
the process is protected by Equation 5 to ensure that weak evidence does not override
prior estimates.
In the absence of evidence of the form described above, the distributions, Pt(C =
e|O = o), should gradually tend to ignorance. If a decay-limit distribution [2] is known
they should tend to it otherwise they should tend to the maximum entropy distribution.
In our scenario, during a dialogue β will ask α to perform certain tasks that we
assume are represented in a structured section of the ontology. Following the reason-
ing above, if α is asked to perform task τ then this may suggest prior beliefs of what
β’s criteria are. For example, suppose α is asked to demonstrate how to photograph
a duck when the object is a “camera suitable for photographing wildlife”. If the on-
tology relates ducks to water to some degree then α may believe that β rates the
criterion “waterproof” as “I would prefer to have this” with some probability. Then
if α is subsequently asked to to demonstrate how to photograph a duck when the
object is a s′ she may believe that “waterproof” is a criterion. Using the semantic-
similarity-based method described in [2], this evidence would update the estimates for
Pt(Waterproof = e|(O = o′, T = τ)) in a way that is moderated by the semantic
distance between s′ and ‘camera suitable for photographing wildlife‘”
The discussion so far has not considered argumentative dialogue such as: “My
grandmother could not climb into that (car)”. This statement would presumably follow
a request to demonstrate the task “how to get into the car” that the observer would rate
against the criterion “suitable for an octogenarian” as “unacceptable”. So this example
at least can be accommodated in the framework as long as we can link the ‘grand-
mother’ with an ‘octogenarian’. Given two strings of ontological concepts, S1 and S2,






where ||S|| is the number of concepts in S, and Sim(·) is measures semantic distance
[9]. A semantically deeper analyses of text would be better, but we claim that this ap-
proach will link such the given statement with the criterion “suitable for an octogenar-
ian” — particularly if the set of admissible criteria are known and agreed in advance.
5.3 Disposition: shaping the stance
Agent β’s disposition is the underlying rationale that he has for a dialogue. α will
be concerned with the confidence in α’s beliefs of β’s disposition as this will affect
the certainty with which α believes she knows β’s key criteria. Gauging disposition in
human discourse is not easy, but is certainly not impossible. We form expectations about
what will be said next; when those expectations are challenged we may well believe that
there is a shift in the rationale.
The bargaining literature consistently advises (see for example [10]) that an agent
should change its stance (one dimension of stance being the ‘nice guy’ / ‘tough guy’
axis) to prevent other agents from decrypting their private information, and so we should
expect some sort of “smoke screen” surrounding any dialogue between competitive
agents. It would be convenient to think of disposition as the mirror-image of stance,
but what matters is the agent’s confidence in its model of the partner. The problem is
to differentiate between a partner that is skilfully preventing us from decrypting their
private information, and a partner that has either had a fundamental change of heart or
has changed his mind in a way that will significantly influence the set of contracts that
he will agree to. The first of these is normal behaviour, and the second means that the
models of the partner may well be inaccurate.
If an agent believes that her partner’s disposition has altered then the entropy of
her model of the partner should be increased — particularly beliefs concerning the key
criteria should be relaxed to prevent the dialogue attempting to enter a “blind alley”, and
to permit the search for common ground to proceed on broader basis. The mechanics for
achieving this are simple: if an agent believes that his partner’s disposition has shifted
then his certainty of belief in the structure of the model of the partner is decreased.
α’s model of β’s disposition is DC = Pt(C = e|O = o) for every criterion in the
ontology, where o is the object of the negotiation. α’s confidence in β’s disposition is
the confidence he has in these distributions. Given a negotiation object o, confidence
will be aggregated from H(C = e|O = o) for every criterion in the ontology. Then the
idea is that if in the negotiation for a camera “for family use” α is asked to demonstrate
how to photograph a drop of water falling from a tap then this would presumably cause
a dramatic difference between Pt(C = e|(O = “family use”)) and Pt(C = e|(O =
“family use”, O′ = “photograph water drops”)). This difference causes α to revise her
belief in “family use”, to revise the disposition towards distributions of higher entropy,
and to approach the negotiation on a broader basis. A high-level diagram of α’s model
of β’s acceptance criteria that includes disposition is shown in Figure 1.
6 Strategies
In this section we describe the components of an argumentation strategy starting with
tools for valuing information revelation that are used to model the fairness of a negoti-
ation dialogue. This work compares with [11], [12] and [13].
Fig. 1. The model of β’s acceptance criteria that lies at the heart of the argumentation strategy.
Agent α





































6.1 Information Revelation: computing counter proposals
Everything that an agent communicates gives away information. The simple offer “you
may purchase this wine for e3” may be intrepretd in a utilitarian sense (e.g. the profit
that you could make by purchasing it), and as information (in terms of the reduc-
tion of your entropy or uncertainty in your beliefs about my limit price for the item).
Information-based agents value information exchanged, and attempt to manage the as-
sociated costs and benefits.
Illocutionary categories and an ontology together form a framework in which the
value of information exchanged can be categorised. The LOGIC framework for argu-
mentative negotiation [3] is based on five illocutionary categories: Legitimacy of the
arguments, Options i.e. deals that are acceptable, Goals i.e. motivation for the negotia-
tion, Independence i.e: outside options, and Commitments that the agent has including
its assets. In general, α has a set of illocutionary categories Y and a categorising func-
tion κ : L → P(Y). The power set, P(Y), is required as some utterances belong to
multiple categories. For example, in the LOGIC framework the utterance “I will not
pay more for a bottle of Beaujolais than the price that John charges” is categorised as
both Option (what I will accept) and Independence (what I will do if this negotiation
fails).
Then two central concepts describe relationships and dialogues between a pair of
agents. These are intimacy — degree of closeness, and balance — degree of fairness.
In this general model, the intimacy of α’s relationship with β, At, measures the amount
that α knows about β’s private information and is represented as real numeric values
over G = Y × V .
Suppose α receives utterance u from β and that category y ∈ κ(u). For any concept
x ∈ V , define ∆(u, x) = maxx′∈concepts(u) Sim(x′, x). Denote the value of Ati in
position (y, x) by At(y,x) then:
At(y,x) = ρ×A
t−1
(y,x) + (1− ρ)× I(u)×∆(u, x)
for any x, where ρ is the discount rate, and I(u) is the information10 in u. The balance
of α’s relationship with βi, Bt, is the element by element numeric difference of At and
α’s estimate of β’s intimacy on α.
We are particularly interested in the concept of intimacy in so far as it estimates
what α knows about β’s criteria, and about the certainty of α’s estimates of the random
variables {Ci}. We are interested in balance as a measure of the ‘fairness’ of the dia-
logue. If α shows β how to take a perfect photograph of a duck then it is reasonable to
expect some information at least in return.
Moreover, α acts proactively to satisfy her needs — that are organised in a hierar-
chy11 of needs, Ξ , and a function ω : Ξ → P(W ) where W is the set of perceivable
states, and ω(χ) is the set of states that satisfy need χ ∈ Ξ . Needs turn ‘on’ sponta-
neously, and in response to triggers. They turn ‘off’ because α believes they are satis-
fied. When a need fires, a plan is chosen to satisfy that need (we do not describe plans
here). If α is to contemplate the future she will need some idea of her future needs
— this is represented in her needs model: υ : T → ×|Ξ|[0, 1] where T is time, and:




i = P(need χi fires at time t).
Given the needs model, υ, α’s relationship model (Relate(·)) determines the target
intimacy, A∗ti , and target balance, B
∗t
i , for each agent i in the known set of agents
Agents. That is, {(A∗ti , Bt∗i)}
|Agents|
i=1 = Relate(υ,X,Y ,Z) where, Xi is the trust
model, Y i is the honour model and Zi is the reliability model as described in [2].
As noted before, the values for intimacy and balance are not simple numbers but are
structured sets of values over Y × V .
When a need fires α first selects an agent βi to negotiate with — the social model of
trust, honour and reliability provide input to this decision, i.e. βi = Select(χ,X,Y ,Z).
We assume that in her social model, α has medium-term intentions for the state of
the relationship that she desires with each of the available agents — these intentions
are represented as the target intimacy, A∗ti , and target balance, B
∗t
i , for each agent βi.
These medium-term intentions are then distilled into short-term targets for the intimacy,
A∗∗ti , and balance, B
∗∗t
i , to be achieved in the current dialogue Ψ





i ). In particular, if the balance target, B
∗∗t
i , is grossly exceeded by β
failing to co-operate then it becomes a trigger for α to terminate the negotiation.
6.2 Computing arguments
For an information-based agent, an incoming utterance is only of interest if it reduces
the uncertainty (entropy) of the world model in some way. In information-based argu-
mentation we are particularly interested in the effect that an argumentative utterance
has in the world model including β’s disposition, and α’s estimate of β’s assessment of
current proposals in terms of its criteria.
10 Information is measured in the Shannon sense, if at time t, α receives an utterance u that may
alter this world model then the (Shannon) information in u with respect to the distributions in
Mt is: I(u) = H(Mt)−H(Mt+1).
11 In the sense of the well-known Maslow hierarchy [14], where the satisfaction of needs that are
lower in the hierarchy take precedence over the satisfaction of needs that are higher.
Information-based argumentation attempts to counter the effect of the partner’s ar-
guments, in the simple negotiation protocol used here, an argumentative utterance, u,
will either contain a justification of the proposal it accompanies, a rating and justifica-
tion of one of α demonstration sequences, or a counter-justification of one of α’s prior
proposals or arguments. If u requests α to perform a task then u may modify β’s dis-
position i.e. the set of conditional estimates of the form: Pt(C = e|O = o)). If β rates
and comments on the demonstration of a sequence then this affects α’s estimate of β’s
likelihood to accept a contract as described in Equation 1 (this is concerned with how β
will apply his criteria).
Suppose that u rates and comments on the performance of a sequence then that
sequence will have been demonstrated in response to a request to perform a task. Given
a task, τ , and a object, s, α may have estimates for P t(C = e|(O = o, T = τ)) — if so
then this suggests a link between the task and a set of one or more criteriaCu. The effect
that u has on β’s criteria (what ever they are) will be conveyed as the rating. In the spirit
of the scenario, we assume that for every criterion and object pair (C, o) α has a supply
of positive argumentative statementsL(C,o). Suppose αwishes to counter the negatively
rated u with a positively rated u′. Let Ψu be the set of all arguments exchanged between
α and β prior to u in the dialogue. Let Mu ⊆ L(C,o) for any C ∈ Cµ. Let Nu ⊆ Mu
such that ∀x ∈ Nu and ∀u′ ∈ Ψu, Sim∗(concepts(x), concepts(u′)) > η for some
constant η. So Nu is a set of arguments all of which (a) have a positive effect on at least
one criterion associated with the negative u, and (b) are at ‘some distance’ (determined
by r) from arguments already exchanged. Then:
u′ =
{
arg minu′∈Nu Sim∗(concepts(u), concepts(u′)) if Nu 6= ∅
arg minu′∈Mu Sim∗(concepts(u), concepts(u′)) otherwise.
So using only ‘fresh’ arguments, α prefers to choose a counter argument to u that is
semantically close to u, and if that is not possible she chooses an argument that has
some general positive effect on the criteria and may not have been used previously.
Suppose that u proposes a contract. α will either decide to accept it or to make a
counter offer. We do not describe the bargaining process here, see [2].
6.3 All together
If βi communicates u then α responds with:
u′ = Argue(u,Mt, Ψ t, A∗∗t, B∗∗t, Cu, Nu,Mu, Du))
where:
– the negotiation mechanisms as explained in Section 6.1 sets parametersA∗∗t, B∗∗t)
(see e.g. [3] for further details);
– the argumentation process determines the parameters Nu,Mu needed to generate
the accompanying arguments to the proposal, see Section 6.2;
– the criteria modeling process determines the set of criteriaCu used by our opponent
to assess the proposals, see Section 5.2; and,
– the disposition modeling sets the distributions Du used to interpret the stance of
the opponent, see Section 5.3.
The personality of the agent will be determined by the particular f chosen to select
the answer to send. The study of concrete functions is subject of ongoing research as
well as their application into a eProcurement setting.
7 Discussion
We have described an approach to argumentation that aims to:
– discover what the partner’s key evaluative criteria are,
– model how the partner is evaluating his key criteria given some evidence,
– influence the partner’s evaluation of his key criteria,
– influence the relative importance that the partner attaches to those criteria, and
– introduce new key criteria when it is strategic to do so.
The ideas described here are an attempt to develop an approach to argumentation that
may be used in the interests of both parties. It aims to achieve this by unearthing the
‘top layer’ of the partner’s reasoning apparatus and by attempting to work with it rather
than against it. To this end, the utterances produced aim to influence the partner to
believe what we believe to be in his best interests — although it may not be in fact.
The utterances aim to convey what is so, and not to point out “where the partner is
wrong”. In the long term, this behaviour is intended to lead to the development of lasting
relationships between agents that are underpinned both by the knowledge that their
partners “treat them well” and that their partners act as they do “for the right reasons”.
The ideas in this paper have been developed within a highly restrictive scenario that
is deliberately asymmetric (being based on a buy / seller relationship). The structure
of the analysis is far more general and applies to any scenario in which something has
to be bought/made/designed that satisfies a need, and that can do various things. The
agents who try to make it do things (use-cases if you like) subjectively rate what they
see.
In previous work [3] we have advocated the gradual development of trust and inti-
macy12 through successive argumentative exchanges as a way of building relationships
between agents. The act of passing private information carries with it a sense of trust of
the sender in the receiver, and having done so the sender will wish to observe that the
receiver respects the information received. In this paper we have gone one step further
by including a modest degree of understanding in the sense that an agent attempts to
understand what her partner likes. This falls well short of a deep model of the part-
ner’s reasoning but we believe strikes a reasonable balance between being meaningful
and being achievable. This augments the tools for building social relationships through
argumentation by establishing:
– trust — my belief in the veracity of your commitments
– intimacy — my belief in the extent to which I know your private information
12 The revelation of private information.
– understanding — my belief in the extent to which I know what you like
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